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FOREWORD
On February 24, 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall, on behalf
of the entire United States Supreme Court, read from the bench
his opinion in Marbury v. Madison.! As would be his custom in
many of the Court's seminal constitutional cases during the early
decades of the nineteenth century, Marshall wrote the majority
opinion, thus creating the indelible, though not entirely accurate,
impression upon contemporaries and subsequent generations of
scholars alike that when the Chief Justice spoke he expressed not
only his own cogent views but also those of the other justices as
well.2
In a complex opinion, noteworthy for its purposeful
indirection3 and bountiful dicta, Marshall explained that while
William Marbury had a vested legal right in his justice of the
peace commission," for which he could pursue the remedy of
mandamus,5 the Supreme Court ultimately lacked jurisdiction to
issue this writ to Secretary of State James Madison.6
Exceptionally clever in its assertion of judicial authority to review
the legal actions of the political branches of the federal
government while avoiding the risk of embarrassment that would
have occurred had the Court issued a mandamus order likely
ignored by the Secretary of State and President Thomas
Jefferson,7 the decision enhanced the prestige of the Court and
helped solidify its institutional independence at a time when it
was most vulnerable to partisan politics.
Few cases in American constitutional law have generated as
much attention as Marbury, which particularly during the last
century or so has achieved, rightly or wrongly, depending upon

1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. For a discussion of Chief Justice John Marshall's influence upon his
fellow justices see generally Donald M. Roper, Judicial Unanimity and the
Marshall Court - A Road to Reappraisal, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1965)
(acknowledging Marshall's paramount influence while refuting the notion that
he necessarily dominated the Court).
3. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSEKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960)

("The decision is a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall's
capacity to sidestep danger while seeming to court it, to advance in one
direction while his opponents are looking in another.").
4. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 162, 172.

5. Id. at 168-73.
6. Id. at 173, 176-77, 180.
7. See Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use
of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wisc. L. REV. 301, 319, 333.
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one's perspective, preeminent status in constitutional law.8
Criticized by some for its flawed constitutional and statutory
analysis, 9 others regard Marshall's opinion as an eloquent defense
of judicial review,' prescient in its vision and fundamentally
sound in its distinction between law and politics.1
To the extent judicial review existed before Marbury, it
essentially amounted to a political act in that courts invoked it
sparingly as "a substitute for revolution"1" in a constitutional
democracy based upon the consent of the governed. In the closing
decades of the eighteenth century, judges were viewed as
intermediaries between the people and the legislative branch, and
the judicial function was understood, in part, as a means of
preserving the boundaries of public authority, including judicial
power." In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the spate of
laws enacted by local legislatures facilitated the emergence of and
respect for an independent judiciary entrusted to protect
individual rights from the tyranny of ephemeral democratic

8. Not surprisingly, there is a considerable body of literature about the
meaning and scope of Marbury v. Madison. For studies in praise of Marbury
see, e.g., GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. II: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:
JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815 (Part I Haskins) 182-204 (1981); MCCLOSKEY,
supra note 3, at 40-44. Some commentators believe that the flaws in Marbury
outweigh its virtues. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 75-88 (1988); Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach
Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and Why You Shouldn't Either, 38
WAKE FOREST. L. REV. 553 (2003). Others consider the case overrated and not
as important as other decisions such as McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). See,
e.g., Michael Klarman, How Great Were the "Great"Marshall Court Decisions?,
87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1113-44 (2001) (questioning the importance of both
Marbury and McCulloch); Jack Rakove, The Originsof JudicialReview: A Plea
for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1997) (de-emphasizing Marbury's
influence in the development of judicial review). For particularly balanced
appraisals of the decision see generally CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT
CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 47-71 (1996); Dean
Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madsion and Original Understandings of Judicial
Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329; Akhil Reed
Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989); Bloch & Marcus, supra note 7; James E.
Pfander, Marbury, OriginalJurisdiction,and the Supreme Court's Supervisory
Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001).
9. There is also much criticism of Marshall's legal reasoning in Marbury.
See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 DUKE L. J. 1; James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992).
10. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 47-71.
11. WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND THE
LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-9, 59-71 (2000).
12. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
3, 74, 93 (1990).
13. See, e.g., Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20, 32-33 (1793) (invalidating
a Virginia law that authorized district court judges to issue injunctions).
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majorities and political factions.14 Within this context, courts
adopted a defensive posture from which as a coordinate branch of
government they refused to enforce ordinary laws that blatantly
conflicted with constitutional limits upon public authority.
Accordingly, judges often invoked the doubtful case rule as a
means of judicial restraint in situations that did not present clear
violations of fundamental law."
Upon the creation of the federal constitution, Alexander
Hamilton sought to explain the role of the federal judiciary in the
constitutional system. In Federalist Paper Number 78, he linked
constitutional supremacy and popular sovereignty to judicial
review when he observed:
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and
the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province
of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded
by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to
them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity
ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute,
the
6
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.'
From this perspective, Hamilton considered an independent
federal judiciary "the bulwar[k] of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments" and the guardian of individual rights
in a constitutional democracy.'7 Insofar as Hamilton outlined the
contours of federal judicial power, he also indicated its potential as
a means for preserving the rule of law in a democratic society.
In several respects, Chief Justice John Marshall drew upon
Hamilton's concepts as well as the burgeoning tradition of judicial
review within the states and federal courts when he crafted his
Marbury opinion. Yet Marshall did more than simply take notice
of the Constitution when he manufactured a conflict between a
portion of a federal law whose constitutionality few questioned and
Article III of the Constitution. For he ignored the doubtful case
rule in order to bolster the role of the Court in constitutional

14. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or
How the Marshall Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 787,
791-92 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (Paterson. J.).
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, 519, 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Heritage
Press ed., 1945).
17. Id. at 405.

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:317

adjudication. 8 In addition, he consciously distinguished between
legal and political questions to insulate the Court from external
political pressures.
Indeed, his seemingly innocuous statement that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is" 9 belied the extent to which Marshall
manipulated the issues in Marbury to assert judicial review over
both the executive branch and Congress and thus enhance the role
of the Court in the constitutional system.
Moreover, his
explanation that "[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each""' rested upon syllogistic reasoning intended to legitimize the
practice of federal judicial review.
Accordingly, through application of common law techniques of
statutory interpretation, Marshall sought to ascertain the
meaning of constitutional limitations.2' Though John Marshall did
not claim anywhere in Marbury a unique role for the Court in
constitutional interpretation, nor expressly assert the doctrine of
judicial supremacy, by the end of the nineteenth and throughout
the twentieth centuries, commentators and jurists increasingly
ascribed these notions to Marbury to either justify the exercise of
judicial review or question the scope of its practice. 2
Although the Constitution does not set forth in precise terms
the doctrine of federal judicial review," it is certainly implicit in
the structure of the constitutional system in which there are three
coordinate branches of the national government: the legislature,
the executive and the judiciary. An integral aspect of separation

18. LEVY, supra note 8, at 81-82.
19. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
20. Id.
21. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 191-208.
22. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbury for the
proposition "that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution... "); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
554 (1895) (invoking Marbury as precedent while invalidating federal income
tax legislation); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (relying, in part,
upon Marbury to assert that "courts are not bound by mere forms... [but] are
at liberty, indeed, are under a solemn duty, to look at the substance of things,
whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has
transcended the limits of its authority."). See also Davison M. Douglas, The
Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The Emergence of a "Great Case," 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003) (discussing the trajectory of Marbury in

constitutional discourse).
23. While Article III of the Constitution establishes a Supreme Court,

provides for the creation of lower federal courts and delineates the contours of
lower federal court and Supreme Court jurisdiction, no express constitutional
language authorizes the federal judiciary to review either state or federal

laws.
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of powers, judicial review exists as a means of maintaining the
constitutional limits of governmental authority. 24 Seemingly antidemocratic in form, in function it protects individual rights from
the tyranny of popular majorities, manipulated by political
factions who create partial laws at the expense of the public
welfare.2 5 Theoretically constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis
and prudential concerns, unelected federal judges with lifetime
tenure bear the responsibility of assessing the boundaries of
governmental power without casting judgment upon the wisdom of
public policy choices made by political actors. In so doing, federal
courts tread a fine line between interpreting the law and making
political judgments.
In large part, the "counter-majoritarian" 21 tendencies of
judicial review expose its vulnerabilities, a point which, Alexander
Hamilton implicitly expressed when, in 1788, he observed that the
judiciary would be the "least dangerous branch" of the federal
government because, lacking influence over either the purse or the
sword, it could only rely upon the executive branch for aid in the
enforcement of its decisions.27 Over the course of the last century,
frequent debate over the parameters of federal judicial review and
mounting concerns about the extent to which judges employ
principles of neutral adjudication to resolve legal disputes 8
demonstrate how susceptible federal courts are to criticism in a
constitutional democracy. Indeed, some of the more virulent
attacks upon judicial intervention in cases involving implied
constitutional rights and doctrines have come from jurists worried
that federal judges have allowed social and political values to
impede dispassionate legal analysis.'
Independent from their
political counterparts, federal courts must often assess the validity
of legislation and determine whether actions of public officials
conform with prescribed legal standards. Yet, ultimately, they
must exercise judgment with care in order to preserve the delicate
balance of power within the constitutional system and the efficacy
of their decisions.

24. See, e.g, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35

(Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing the role of the court in separation of
powers cases).
25. See Samuel R. Olken, The Business of Expression: Economic Liberty,
PoliticalFactions and the ForgottenFirstAmendment Legacy of Justice George
Sutherland, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 249, 264, 268-69 (2002).
26. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SuPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 16, at 520.
28. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
ConstitutionialLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
29. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996-1001 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning about the dangers of Supreme Court
adjudication based upon political and social concerns).
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In large part, because judicial review is a theoretical
construct, its parameters reflect the underlying policies of
separation of powers: legitimacy, efficiency and tyranny." Modern
assessment of the meaning and significance of Marbury, therefore,
often involves the interplay of these policies, as commentators
attempt to justify, explain or critique the practice of judicial
review. Though John Marshall did not expressly invoke such
concepts in his now fabled opinion, in retrospect, its curious
mixture of rhetoric and legal analysis suggests Marbury's pivotal
role in the evolution of judicial review. Indeed, the Chief Justice's
conscious distinction between law and politics, the means by which
he derived a constitutional conflict, his explanation about the
limits of judicial power and the manner in which he linked
constitutional supremacy and popular sovereignty all raised
questions about judicial legitimacy, efficiency and tyranny that
continue to permeate the landscape of constitutional law.
Interestingly, at the time Marshall delivered his opinion there
was much more interest in its discussion of William Marbury's
vested legal rights, the propriety of mandamus as a legal remedy
and the amenability of public officials to the rule of law than in
Marshall's seemingly straightforward assertions about judicial
review.
Thus, initially, the political aspects of the case
overshadowed its points about judicial power. Moreover, the
subtle manner in which the Chief Justice construed the meaning
of the Constitution through his application of common law canons
of interpretation also appears, in retrospect, to have quelled
somewhat debate about the Supreme Court's refusal to enforce a
federal law.
Eventually, as perceptions changed throughout subsequent
decades of the nineteenth century and into the last one about the
role of federal courts, in general, and the United States Supreme
Court, in particular, Marshall's observations about judicial review
attracted increased attention. For much of the last century or so
historical and legal commentators have frequently studied and
reassessed the meaning and parameters of judicial review.
Throughout this ongoing analytical process they have closely
scrutinized Marbury and subjected to critical examination
Marshall's notions about judicial review and the role of the Court
in constitutional interpretation.
Not surprisingly, numerous
critiques of Marshall's methodology and reasoning emerged,3
which, in turn, have raised a vast spectrum of questions and
concerns about the process of judicial review and the institutional
objectives of the federal judiciary.
30.

See

DAAN BRAVEMAN, WILLIAM

C.

BANKS & RODNEY A. SMOLLA,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 166-

68 (4th ed. 2000).
31. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, surpa note 9.
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Marbury, therefore, has become a touchstone in constitutional
discourse, and for this reason analysis of American judicial
review-either in a historical sense or in terms of a modern
critique-often includes discussion of this seminal opinion. Indeed,
as testament to its enduring influence, some commentators invoke
the case as precedent for judicial supremacy in matters of
constitutional interpretation32 while others regard Marshall's
opinion as an illustration of the inherent problems of an unelected
judiciary interpreting the Constitution.33
Aside from its points about judicial power, Marbury
addressed some fundamental questions about the role of courts in
a democratic republic. Viewed in this light, the case takes on even
greater importance because of its widespread influence in many
aspects of public law. For example, careful analysis of the decision
reveals the origins of the political question doctrine which, as
Professor Michael Seidman explains in his intriguing article that
appears in this issue, illustrates both the virtues and vices of
judicial review in a constitutional democracy. Other facets of the
case have influenced judicial precedent about executive privilege,
the appointment and removal of executive branch officials, the
scope of presidential foreign policy authority and prudential limits
Moreover, as Professor Thomas Merrill
upon judicial power.3
indicates in his article, Marshall's discussion of whether the
Supreme Court could issue writs of mandamus to public officials
presaged the development of administrative law.35
The articles that appear in this special symposium issue of
the law review illustrate the enduring allure of Marbury and its
continued relevance to modern constitutional law. They also
reflect a diverse range of views about the nature of judicial review
and the meaning of Marbury. In this regard, Professors William
E. Nelson, Larry D. Kramer and Samuel R. Olken analyze
Marbury in the context of broader historical themes yet draw
different conclusions about the historical significance of this case
and the objectives of Chief Justice John Marshall. Assessing
Marbury from the perspective of the late twentieth century,
Professors Mark Tushnet and Walter J. Kendall question the
efficacy of judicial review in a legal system in which powerful
32. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 344 (1987)
(proclaiming that "[u]nder Marbury v. Madison the judiciary has the final
word...").
33. See BICKEL, supra note 26, at 16-23. For a more modern critique of
judicial review see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (refuting the concept of judicial supremacy
and advocating an increased role for the political branches in the resolution of
constitutional issues).
34. See Amar, supra note 8 at 446-49.
35. See also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
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interest groups and political factions wield considerable influence
over the administration of justice.
Two hundred years old, Marbury v. Madison, 6 continues to
enthrall scholars and law students, in large part, as the articles in
this symposium issue suggest, because it demonstrates both the
promise and paradox of judicial review in a constitutional
democracy.

Samuel R. Olken, Professor of Law and Symposium Chair,
Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review: Legitimacy, Tyranny
and Democracy

October 3, 2003

36. 5 U.S. 137.

